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now standard school. His approach is not without controversy. Some
may object to taking seriously Know Nothing politicos' pretensions to
social and labor reform. Purists may likewise regret his rather anach-
ronistic portrayal of the Know Nothing political style as "populist."
Presentism may also be evident in the extended Ventura analogy.
Nonetheless, Voss-Hubbard's meticulous attention to the Know Noth-
ings' local roots and antiparty spirit offers intriguing insights on pre-
Civil War political developments.
Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence Warfrom Belmont to Appomattox,
by William B. Feis. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. xiv,
330 pp. Maps, illustirations, notes, bibliography, index. $39.95 cloth,
$16.95 paper.
Reviewer Douglas M. Paul is a Ph.D. candidate at Ohio State University.
Civil War historians have often recognized the importance of intelli-
gence, yet they have rarely explored it beyond narrow studies of par-
ticular battles and campaigns or sensational accounts of behind-the-
lines espionage. With the notable exception of Edwin Fishel (to whom
this book is co-dedicated), few scholars have systematically examined
the impact of intelligence on any facet of the war. William B. Feis
changes that with Grant's Secret Service, an in-depth examination and
evaluation of Ulysses S. Grant's collection and use of intelligence. Feis
contends that determining "what a commander knew, when he knew
it, and how he used what he knew offers a valuable—and perhaps
more evenhanded—perspective from which to view the nature of
command in the Civil War" (3). He applies that perspective to Grant
with a chapter on each major battle or campaign, from Belmont in
1861 to Appomattox in 1865.
What emerges is a picture of a discriminating, confident, often
daring mind committed to offensive operations and not overly con-
cerned with the enemy's own plans—a recipe for military success.
Grant possessed coup d'oeil, the ability to make sound decisions in the
midst of chaos and to make sense out of uncertainty. Unlike some of
his counterparts, who disdained the "secret service," Grant actively
pursued intelligence and supported its gatherers faithfully During the
Vicksburg campaign, he used Grenville Dodge's network of scouts
and spies to discover Corifederate whereabouts and intentions.
(Housed at the State Historical Society of Iowa, Dodge's papers pro-
vide ample opportunity for historians wishing to follow Feis's lead.)
Facing Lee in the East, a more difficult task. Grant looked to the Army
of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information (BMI), created in
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1863. The first official intelligence apparatiis in the U.S. Army, the BMI
provided key information—gleaned from Richmond spy rings, news-
papers, and scouts—which Grant used to defeat Lee.
A lack of information could make a command inert and vulner-
able, as in George McCleUan's case. Grant realized early on that all
generals, including the enemy, face this düemma, but instead of end-
lessly waiting for perfect intelligence, he boldly took the initiative.
He made mistakes. At Shiloh, according to Feis, it was Grant's belief
that the Confederates were unable and unwilling to attack that led to
the disastrous first day, not an intelligence failure. More important
was Grant and the BMI's faüure to discover and prevent Jubal Early's
Shenandoah Valley raid in the summer of 1864. Feis argues that such
miscues were often the result of general human faüings such as the
misperception and wishful thinking that afflict all judgments. More
than mere exculpation, Feis ülustrates the difficulties of generalship
while demonsti'ating how Grant the man both persevered and ex-
celled.
Feis's pioneering approach sheds light on Grant but precludes
much contextual analysis. In other words. Grant is somewhat in a
vacuum here. One hopes that Feis will undertake a scrutiny of the in-
teUigence used by other Civil War generals—especially Robert E. Lee
—for comparison. But with this portrait Feis challenges the view of
Grant as the butcher of Cold Harbor winning only with superior num-
bers. The lens of intelligence shows Grant as a complex flgure calculat-
ing with inteUect and instinct. Despite Sherman's statement to the con-
trary. Grant really did "Care a Damn for What the Enemy Does Out of
His Sight," to devastating effect (267).
Struggle for the Heartland: The Civil War along the Mississippi Corridor,
by Joseph W. Foulke. Pittsburgh: Dorrance PubUshing Co., Inc., 200l!
310 pp. Maps, notes, illustrations, appendixes, bibliographv index
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Reviewer Terry L. Beckenbaugh is assistant professor of history at McNeese
State University in Lake Charles, Louisiana. His research and writing have fo-
cused on Civil War general Samuel Ryan Curtis.
In Struggle for the Heartland, Joseph W. Foulke tackles a broad subject:
the Civü War in the Mississippi River valley Foulke argues that even-
tual Union victory resulted from events in the West, specifically the Fed-
eral conquest of the Mississippi River valley He highlights Iowans'
valuable contributions to the war effort, especially in the West.
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